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Summary 
 
Birth masculinization in China since 1980s has drawn much attentions of scholars as well 
as politicians. As in many other Asian countries, there have been consistently more boys born 
than girls in China. Given the huge population in China, an unusually high Sex Ratio at Birth 
(SRB) defined as the number of baby boys per 100 baby girls born during a certain period,  
implies a great change in the future sex structure, and thus has long-term effects on almost every 
aspect of the society.  
 
The earlier studies found that education has a positive effect on SRB because people with higher 
level of education have better access to sex-selective technology and thus tend to have higher 
level of SRB than the less educated. However, now the sex-selective technology is widely 
available and not costly to get. So whether or not to perform sex selection on the child is based on 
how much boys are preferred over girls. In general, people with higher education will have open 
mind and not be restrained by the traditional preference for son. Therefore, education should have 
more discernable effects on decreasing SRB.  
 
In this thesis, we study the determination of the birth masculinity with special focus on the effects 
of education. First, provincial and county level from the 2010 census data in China are used to 
analyze the determinants for the great regional differentials of SRB. We perform correlation and 
regression analyses. Multiple regression models are established to explain the determinants of the 
overall SRB as well as the SRB for the first two orders. To indicate the education level in the 
region, we calculate the average numbers of years of schooling of the population in the region, 
for the total population and for females and males. We also calculate the relative education level 
of female and male. Then we include the overall education and the relative sex-specific education 
levels into our regression models, together with other explanatory variables suggested by the 
earlier findings.   
 
In view of the problem that we were using the aggregate data to make inferences about 
relationships at the individual level, the individual level data from China General Socio Survey in 
2008 is collected. With these data, we analyze how sex composition of the children is determined 
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by parents‟ and households‟ characteristics. We generate a variable called “degree of son 
preference” base on the sex composition of the children in the family, assigning higher value to 
families with more sons than daughters. Since the dependent variable “degree of son preference” 
is a categorical variable, we established the General Ordered Response models and perform the 
Generalized Ordered Logit Estimations. The education variables we use here are the 
wife‟s/mother‟s and the husbands‟/father‟s education, indicated as categorical variables. They 
enter the General Ordered Response models together with other explanatory variables. 
 
From the multiple regressions, we find that education is an important determinant for SRB 
differentials across regions. We find that provinces with generally higher level of education tend 
to have lower SRB for the second births. We find female education has strong negative effect on 
SRB. Both provincial data and county-level data suggest that regions where women are less 
deprived in education are associated with lower SRB. It works especially significant on decrease 
the excess male births among the second children.  So improvement in female education seems 
able to reduce SRBs substantially. On the other hand, the male advantages in education tend to 
increase SRBs, which is suggested by both levels of data.  
Analyses with the individual level data confirm some of our findings from the aggregate data 
analyses. We find higher level of wife‟s education is associated with lower level of son 
preference, manifested by a lower number of boys among the children in the family. And the 
husband‟s education level is likely to reinforce son preference, at least in terms of a higher ratio 
of sons among the children.  
Based on these findings we conclude that in current China, education has started to play a role of 
reducing people‟s preference for sons. The improvement in people‟s education level, especially 
the female education level, will accelerate the pace for the sex ratio at birth to return to the 
normal range.  
 
Most part of the data collection and organization is performed using Microsoft Excel 2010. And 
the correlation and regression analyses are performed using STATA 12.0. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
Birth masculinization in China since 1980s has drawn much attentions of scholars as well 
as politicians. As in many other Asian countries, there have been consistently more boys 
born than girls in China. Given the huge population in China, an unusually high Sex 
Ratio at Birth (SRB) defined as the number of baby boys per 100 baby girls born during a 
certain period, implies a great change in the future sex structure, and thus has long-term 
effects on almost every aspect of the society.  
 
The earlier studies found that education has a positive effect on SRB because people with 
higher level of education have better access to sex-selective technology and thus tend to 
have higher level of SRB than the less educated. Other studies point out higher education 
is associated with lower SRB because education changes people‟s traditional preference 
for son. Thus education has a negative effect on SRB. In this thesis, we want to find out 
how education affects SRB, figuring out the sign and magnitude.  
 
So in this thesis, we main want to answer two questions: 
 
How can education explain the regional disparities of SRB in current China?  
To find out the answer, we collect aggregate data on two levels: provincial and county 
level from the 2010 census data in China(NSB, 2010). There are 31 observations in the 
provincial data and 1069 observations in the county level data. These two data contain 
the aggregate variables averaged across the population in that region. We will first 
examine if there are truly great disparities in SRB across regions. Then we will establish 
multiple regression models to study the determination of the birth masculinity with 
special focus on the effects of education. Multiple regression models will be established 
to explain the determinants of the overall SRB as well as the SRB for the first two orders 
if they are truly account for much variance in the overall SRB. To indicate the education 
level in the region, we will calculate the average numbers of years of schooling of the 
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population in the region, for the total population and for females and males. We also 
calculate the relative education level of female and male. Then we will include the 
overall education and the relative sex-specific education levels into our regression models, 
together with other explanatory variables suggested by the earlier findings.   
 
How sex composition of children is determined at individual or household level?  
In view of the problem that we were using the aggregate data to make inferences about 
relationships at the individual level, we want to supplement our aggregate analysis with 
individual level analysis. Source of the individual data is from China General Socio 
Survey in 2008. The survey was carried out by Department of Sociology, Renmin 
University of China & Social Science Division, Hong Kong Science and Technology 
University, and directed by Dr. Li Lulu & Dr. Bian Yanjie (Yanjie & Lulu, 2008). There 
are 6000 observations including respondents from both urban areas and rural areas. The 
data has rich information on individual and household‟s education, socioeconomic and 
demographic characteristics. We will generate a variable called “degree of son preference” 
base on the sex composition of the children in the family, assigning higher value to 
families with more sons than daughters. Since our dependent variable “degree of son 
preference” is a categorical variable, we will establish the General Ordered Response 
models and perform the Generalized Ordered Logit Estimations. The education variables 
we use here are the wife‟s/mother‟s and the husbands‟/father‟s education, indicated as 
categorical variables. They enter the General Ordered Response models together with 
other explanatory variables. 
 
Analyzing both aggregate and individual data, we will be able to find the relation 
between SRB and education without running into biased conclusions that could be 
resulted in by using just one of them. In this sense, our analyses should be consistent and 
reliable.  
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1.2 Literature Review 
Birth masculinity is a common social and demographical phenomenon in many Asian 
countries, such as China, India and South Korea. A great number of studies have been 
devoted to analyze such large excess of male births, trying to find appropriate 
explanations for it. The common concept we often use is the sex ratio at birth (SRB). It is 
computed as the number of male births for 100 female births during a certain time frame 
(usually a year) within a certain geographical or administrative region. A range from 102 
to 107 boys born to 100 girls is considered as normal. While over 110 boys to 100 girls is 
considered as “abnormal”.  When the level reaches 115 or higher, it is usually considered 
as “worrisome”, especially if it is observed for several successive years. There are a large 
amount of researches on the determination of the inordinate SRBs in different countries. 
As summarized by Guilmoto (2009), today‟s birth masculinization relies on the following 
three factors: 
(1) The entrenched son preference (“readiness”);  
(2) Access to modern sex selection technology (“ability”)  
(3) The pressure caused by fertility decline (“squeeze”)  
Under these circumstances, parents are willing to, able to and have no alternative but to 
resort to active sex selection of their offspring, leading to an increase in SRB. This is a 
very concise and powerful framework, under which various factors affect the level of 
SRB via one or several of the above channels. Earlier findings show that the highest sex 
ratios are observed in countries with a combination of son preference, easy access to sex 
selective technology, and low fertility rate (Banister, 2004; Zhu, Lu, & Hesketh, 2009).  
 Son preference 
In the international scope, gender preferences are diversified across different societies. 
Son preference is not found everywhere and not dominant in many societies (Fuse, 2010). 
While high levels of SRB are often observed in countries with traditional preference for 
4 
 
sons, suggesting a possible causality between attitudinal son preference and the 
manifested behavior of son preference.  
Son preference has its root in Confucian gender norm: the patrilineal kinship. It was a 
dominant kinship in East Asia during preindustrial periods. It dictated women/wife‟s 
absolute obedience to the men/husband in the family. Under such circumstances, men 
were highly valued than women and women were extremely marginalized. Women‟s 
imperative duty was to bear sons for husband‟s family, ensuring the continuity of the 
family line. On the other hand, it also defines the duty of sons in the family, such as they 
must be filial to parents and support their parents when they grow older.  
Some study assert that it is the strong preference for son that drives couples to perform 
sex-selective abortion(Hesketh, 2011). Chuang and Das Gupta(2007) also implies that the 
rise in SRB in South Korea can be largely attributed to people‟s traditional preference for 
son; and the decline since the mid-1990s in SRB is associated with the reductions in son 
preference in Korean society. Almost all studies on SRB consider son preference as one 
of the most important reasons for the abnormally high SRB in East Asia. One often 
discussed question is how important is the role of son preference plays in determining 
inordinate SRBs, relative to the roles of other factors. Someone think the effects of son 
preference on high SRB are more prominent than economic factors (Tan, 2008). Another 
often discussed question is the relation between son preference and modernization and 
industrialization. In China and India, SRBs seem to increase alongside with the 
industrialization and modernization for several decades. Some studies suggest that 
modernization reduces fertility and makes the latent son preference manifested in 
behavior (Filmer, Friedman, & Schady, 2009). While others point out modernization has 
positive effects on reducing son preference and thus can reduce SRBs (Chung & Das 
Gupta, 2007). 
Sex-selective abortion 
Many studies recognize the role of sex selective abortion plays on occurrence of 
inordinate SRBs. Before access to sex-selective technology, a usual way to reduce 
number of girls in the family is by infanticide or neglect of health care for girls, i.e. by 
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great female-biased infant and child mortality. Since legislation against such behavior 
gets more severe nowadays, female infanticide is very rare. Parents who want to 
manipulate the sex of child would usually resort to ultrasonographic sex determination 
and then perform abortion if it diagnoses a female fetus. Therefore, it is an important 
reason for high SRBs.  
Some studies point out that sex selective abortion accounts for almost all the excess male 
births in China (Zhu et al., 2009).  They prove that excess births of boys are not because 
of under-registration of female births, but due to wide use of sex selective abortion. 
Attané (2009) also implies that sex-selective abortion leads directly to the increase in 
SRB.  
China’s family planning policy 
Another relevant factor is China‟s family policy. The main mechanism is the policy lower 
the fertility, people with son preference are “pushed” to use gender-selection technology.   
In fact, there are great variations in China‟s fertility policy across provinces. In urban 
areas or among people with a nonagricultural household registration status, the majority 
is under the one-child policy, covering 35.4% of China‟s population. The “1.5 child 
policy” is referred to the rule that second child is allowed after certain years of spacing if 
the first child is a girl. This policy is implemented in the rural areas of 19 provinces, 
covering about 53.6% of China‟s population. Only 6 provinces allow two children for 
rural couples unconditional on the sex of the first child, and this category covers 9.7% of 
total population. Besides, people of ethnic groups are usually allowed to have two or 
more children. Those who are only children themselves are also allowed to have two 
children. (Gu, Wang, Guo, & Zhang, 2007)  
China‟s family planning policy has profoundly changed people‟s fertility behavior. It not 
only reduces the total fertility rate to a fairy low level, but also has induced high SRB 
levels in many provinces. Ebenstein (2010) asserts that there is a causally link between 
the “missing girls” and the enforcement of the one-child policy. Some study points out 
that the “1.5-child” policy accounts most for the inordinate SRB, as the highest sex ratio 
were observed in those provinces (Zhu et al., 2009). Some study even quantifies the 
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contribution of the one-child to the high SRBs: strict enforcement of the one-child policy 
can account for 94% of total increase in SRB in 1990, 57% and 54% for the 1991-2000 
and 2001-2005 birth cohorts respectively. 7 extra boys per 100 girls for the 1991-2005 
birth cohorts. Policy effect passed the robust test, are not confounded by other policy 
shocks or economic changes. (Li, Yi, & Zhang, 2011) 
The explanation is couples are under the constraint of low fertility imposed by the policy, 
so they tend to perform sex-selection to get a son as earlier as possible. It drives up the 
SRBs for the first and second orders, contributes most part of overall excess of male 
births.   
Socioeconomic characteristics  
Socioeconomic characteristics affect SRB via their various effects on individuals‟ son 
preference, access to sex-selective technology and their fertility levels. Attané (2009) 
analyzes provincial census data, and finds that extreme poverty, family support for 
elderly and lower fertility together encourage sex-selective behaviors and thus drives up 
SRB in China. Chuang and Das Gupta „s (2007) study points out the significant effect of 
development on the decline of son preference in South Korea.   
Using the county level data from 2000 census and the 1% intercensal survey of 2005, 
Guilmoto and Ren (2011) identify an inverted-U relationship between SRB and 
socioeconomic status, i.e. the poorest and the richest households have lower SRB than 
those in the middle. Their finding is quite illuminating as previous researches only 
identify the positive relation between economic well-being and high SRB. For example in 
India, the relation is linear and increasing (Jha et al., 2011). Some of the motivation for 
China‟s strong son preference is economic, but it is not the driving force. We observe 
high SRBs in both richest provinces (Guangdong and Jiangsu) and poorest provinces 
(Jiangxi and Guizhou). But less developed regions like Tibet and Xinjiang have SRB 
close to normal level.    
Education 
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Education is often an explanatory variable for the change in fertility behaviors. It has 
been identified that improvement of female education plays a robust role in fertility 
decline (Drèze & Murthi, 2001; Ebenstein, 2010). Also many studies have discussed the 
effects of education on birth masculinization. But the findings are somehow ambiguous 
and conflicting.    
Gu & Roy (1995) points out a positive link between China‟s SRB and education in 1990s. 
Other studies also find that more education is unlikely to ameliorate the shortage of girls 
(Croll, 2002; Baochang Gu & Li, 1994; Retherford & Roy, 2003). Banister (2004) reports 
that there was a decline in “missing girls” associated with the decline of illiteracy, but as 
illiteracy declined further the shortage of girls has become more extreme from late 1970s 
until now. Guilmoto (2008) finds out Indian women with better education tend to have 
higher SRB. Explanations for positive education effect on SRB increase include better 
access to information, more planned reproductive behavior, better financial ability to 
access medical services and possible upward social mobility through marriage.  
A multilevel analysis of SRB in China (with 2000 Census data) points out low education 
is significantly correlated with high SRB, and therefore increasing education has positive 
effect of bring SRB back to normal (Guo, 2007). Ebenstein‟s(2010) comparative study 
shows that data from India indicates that mothers with higher education appear more 
likely to have a son than the less educated; while data from China shows that mothers‟ 
education is not a significant factor accounting for the male birth. A recent study further 
shows that the improvement of female education will constantly decrease son preference 
and China‟s SRB is about to decline as the socioeconomic improvement (Chen & Hu, 
2012).  Another recent study shows education also plays a role in reducing SRB in India. 
The conditional sex ratio for second-order births declines much greater in mothers with 
10 or more years of education than those with no education (Jha et al., 2011). There are 
also parity differentials of education effects. Yang (2006) points out in China mother‟s 
education has positive effect on decrease SRB for first order but not significant for 
second order.  
Chung and Das Gupta‟s (2007) study on the decline of SRB in South Korea is 
illuminating. They find the drastic decline in son preference is attributable more to social 
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norm spreading through population, rather than the actual increases in proportions of 
higher education or better socioeconomic status. It has something to do with the diffusion 
of new ideas. In the first stage, abandonment of son preference happen among the people 
who are most educated; then it gets spread throughout a society. In this sense, we may not 
be able to find clear and unidirectional relationship between socioeconomic 
characteristics (including education) and their underlying and/or manifested son 
preference, at the individual or household level. But at the societal level, the relationship 
can be clear. Here, they implicitly point out one critical effect of education on reducing 
SRB: there should be quite a few people who are highly educated and start to adopt new 
gender norm. If a new norm can be spread fast through a society, then the effects of 
education on SRB are actually amplified by passing the new gender norm to the less 
educated group.  
To sum up, education can affect SRB in the following ways: 
(1) Higher education (usually alongside with better economic status) provides better 
information and access to the sex-selective technology, facilitating the realization 
of attitudinal son preference into reality. 
(2) Higher education leads to lower fertility, inducing more sex-selection on earlier 
orders of births and thus increase the overall SRB. 
(3) Prevalence of the sex-selective technology makes education‟s positive effect on 
SRB less prominent, where education seems an irrelevant factor.  
(4) Higher education makes individuals more open to modern gender norm and 
abandon son preference, which results in fewer sex-selections and thus reduce the 
overall SRB. 
(5) Higher education can trigger normative change within the society as a whole, 
rather than just through changes in individuals as their socioeconomic 
circumstances improved.  
 
Based on the above discussion, the thesis is organized as follows: in chapter 2, we begin 
with a brief description of the current SRB in China, with information from the latest 
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nationwide census; and then we use the province level and the county level data to 
explore possible determinants of SRB. In chapter 3, we use individual data from the 
“China General Social Survey（CGSS）” of 2008 to examine how the sex composition 
of children is determined at individual and household level. In chapter 4, we will make a 
brief summary of our findings.  
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2 SRB Determinants-with 2010 Census Data 
2.1 SRB Distribution in China 
2.1.1 The 2010 Census Data 
The nationwide census is conducted every 10 years in China. The latest one was 
conducted in 2010. Each person was obliged to report his/her authentic personal and 
household information to the census investigators. There were two forms of questionnaire 
used in the census: the short-form and the long-form.  
The short-form has 18 questions, 6 of them asking about the household conditions while 
the rest asking about individual information. Basic demographic information like name, 
age, gender, level of education, ethnicity/nationality, current residence, registered 
residence, migration were covered by these questions. While questions about the 
household include the number of people living within the household, their registered 
residence, the number of people who was born and die in the past year ( between 
November 1
st
 2009 and October 31
st
 2010), the size of residential housing area and the 
number of rooms in the house/apartment.  
The long-form was used to 10% of the total households in China. There were 45 
questions. Besides the same information covered by the short-form, the long-form 
recorded migration, health status, employment status, fertility and other household 
conditions in finer details.   
Information from the short-form and the long-form was organized and sort into two 
groups of tabulations: the general dataset and the long-form dataset. These data was 
published on the website of and can be found under the link “Tabulation on the 2010 
population census of the P.R.C”(NSB, 2010).   
In this thesis, we will use data from two levels: the provincial level and the county level. 
Each province has its own statistic bureau, which is responsible for summarizing and 
publishing the 2010 census tabulations in that region. And the tabulations have the same 
format and structure as those published by NSB. That is tables with the same name 
contain same variables and these variables are listed in the same order. Therefore, it is 
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easy for us to collect information for the each of our variables, both on the provincial and 
county level data. We can find 31sets of tabulations of the 2010 census data, one for each 
province. These tabulations are published on the webpages of the provincial statistic 
bureaus. And we can find the links from the webpage of National Bureau of 
Statistics(NSB, 2010).  
The provincial data we use include data from all the 31 provinces. These provincial 
administrative regions include 4 municipalities directly under the central government, 5 
autonomous regions and 22 provinces (called “provinces” hereafter).   
The county level data contains observations from 1069 counties. County is the lowest 
administrative level in China. The variables from the tabulations are averages across the 
population in the county. Some provinces only provide tabulations on the city-level 
(which is one level higher than county). These data are averages across all the counties, 
therefore more heterogeneity are lost compared to county data. We thus do not include 
these data into our sample. 
The counties from Jiangxi, Shandong, Shanxi and Tibet have important variables (for our 
research interest) missing for unknown reasons, therefore are not included in our sample.  
However, this sample is still very representative for the total since it covers most 
provinces in China. The observations have considerable diversity in SRB, education and 
other socioeconomic aspects. 
2.1.2 Sex Ratio at Birth 
Based on our research interest, the key variable is the Sex Ratio at Birth (SRB). Table 6-
1(NSB, 2010) from the long-form dataset presents the levels of SRB directly. Each 
province also publishes such tabulation under with the same title – Table 6-1(NSB, 2010). 
We can find the overall SRB and SRB for 5 orders of births of 31 provinces and 1070 
counties. Background of these SRBs is the number of boys and girls born between 
November 1
st
 2009 and October 31
st
 2010. The overall SRB is the number of boys born 
per 100 girls in that province. The SRBs for different orders are ratios of boys to girls 
among the same order as born to their families. For example, the SRB for first order is 
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the sex ratio computed among the births who were born as the first children in their 
family.  
Table 2.1 The SRB of 31 provinces from 2000 and 2010 census data 
          province    srb2010   srb2000  changes 
  1.        Beijing      112.15    114.58  -2.12 
  2.        Tianjin      114.59    112.97   1.43 
  3.          Hebei      118.71    118.46   .211 
  4.         Shanxi      113.07    112.75   .284 
  5. Inner Mongolia      108.87    108.48    .36 
  6.       Liaoning      112.91    112.17    .66 
  7.          Jilin      115.67    109.87   5.28 
  8.   Heilongjiang       115.1    107.52   7.05 
  9.       Shanghai      111.49    115.51  -3.48 
 10.        Jiangsu      121.38    120.19    .99 
 11.       Zhejiang      118.36    113.11   4.64 
 12.          Anhui      131.07    130.76   .237 
 13.         Fujian      125.71    120.26   4.53 
 14.        Jiangxi      128.27    138.01  -7.06 
 15.       Shandong      124.28    113.49   9.51 
 16.          Henan      127.64     130.3  -2.04 
 17.          Hubei      123.94    128.02  -3.19 
 18.          Hunan      125.78    126.92  -.898 
 19.      Guangdong      129.49    137.76     -6 
 20.        Guangxi         122     128.8  -5.28 
 21.         Hainan      129.43    135.04  -4.15 
 22.      Chongqing       113.8     115.8  -1.73 
 23.        Sichuan      112.98    116.37  -2.91 
 24.        Guizhou       126.2    105.37   19.8 
 25.         Yunnan      113.61    110.57   2.75 
 26.          Tibet      100.08     97.43   2.72 
 27.        Shaanxi       116.1    125.15  -7.23 
 28.          Gansu      124.79    119.35   4.56 
 29.        Qinghai      112.69    103.52   8.86 
 30.        Ningxia      114.36    107.99    5.9 
 31.       Xinjiang      105.56    106.65  -1.02 
 
 
From Table 2.1, we find there are large differences in SRBs across provinces. The 
highest levels are found in Jiangxi, Guangdong, Hainan, Anhui and Henan where SRBs 
are above or closely to 130; while the lowest are found in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang and 
Tibet, within the normal range for SRB. Over half of the 31 provinces have levels higher 
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than 120, which can be considered as sever birth masculinity. The other provinces have 
SRBs between 110 and 120, which can be considered as slightly deviations from the 
normal range.  
Figure 2.1 Sex Ratio at Birth across Provinces (2000 Census) 
 
We map the changes in SRB from the 2000 (using the data from the 2000 census (NSB, 
2000) to 2010. From Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 we can see that the provinces in the 
Middle and East China have the highest SRBs. And in the West and Northeast, the SRBs 
are not severely distorted. However, we notice that provinces in the Northeast, 
Heilongjiang and Jilin, and the province in the Southwest, Guizhou experienced a fast 
birth masculinization between 2000 and 2010. Especially in Guizhou, the SRB level 
jumped from 105.37 to 126.2. Some provinces have high SRB in both census years, like 
Jiangxi, Anhui and Guangdong. In some provinces, the SRB slighted decreased, from a 
record- high level to a slightly milder level. For example, province Guangxi used to have 
SRB as high as 128, but the 2010 census data shows the SRB has declined to 122. To 
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sum up, even though, there are some changes in SRBs from 2000 to 2010, the regional 
differentials continue to be significant.  
Figure 2.2 Sex Ratio at Birth across Provinces (2010 Census) 
 
From Table 2.2 we can see that the first order is not far deviated from the normal, even 
though we observe some differentials across provinces. However, the second order is 
much above the normal range of SRB. We find Beijing, Anhui, Shandong, Hubei and 
Guizhou have the highest level for this. We are little shocked to find that Beijing has such 
a high SRB in the second order of births, since it is the biggest city in China and is 
supposed to have least preference for son and thus lower SRBs. Most provinces have 
SRB peaks in the third order of births. SRBs in the later orders are high and contain large 
variations. They seem shocking but given that most Chinese families are only allowed to 
have one or two children, these numbers should not account much for the overall SRB. 
Note that the SRB for the fifth order in Beijing should be an error. We refer to the 
original table 6-1(NSB, 2010) of the long-form dataset, there were 2 boys and 0 girls 
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born as the fifth child. Therefore, the abnormally large value must be a calculation 
mistake. It is so far inappropriate to say that the distortion in the first and second orders is 
most responsible for the overall distortion in SRB. But we do get some hints that there 
must be some correlations between them and given the weights on the first two orders 
(births as first and second children account for 93.45% of the total births that the census 
counted during 2009 and 2010), the correlations are expected to be strong.  
Table 2.2 Sex Ratio at Birth and the SRBs for Different orders (2010 Census) 
     +----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
     |       Province      srb    srb_1    srb_2    srb_3    srb_4    srb_5 | 
     |----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
     |        Beijing   112.15   107.31   137.58      260      900   572157 | 
     |        Tianjin   114.59   111.77   119.77   173.08      325      300 | 
     |          Hebei   118.71   108.98   128.81   184.73   145.34   214.29 | 
     |         Shanxi   113.07   112.51    107.9   165.86   256.41      200 | 
     | Inner Mongolia   108.87   107.32   109.78   153.33   144.44      600 | 
     |----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
     |       Liaoning   112.91    110.5   116.64   200.74   153.85      150 | 
     |          Jilin   115.67   116.46   109.21    169.6    92.86      100 | 
     |   Heilongjiang    115.1    115.8   111.85   124.09     87.5      100 | 
     |       Shanghai   111.49   106.35   128.43   201.92   157.14      300 | 
     |        Jiangsu   121.38   114.77   135.01   153.37   136.81   157.14 | 
     |----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
     |       Zhejiang   118.36    109.7   131.95   192.72   165.31      400 | 
     |          Anhui   131.07   113.01   168.32   245.87      275   342.86 | 
     |         Fujian   125.71    112.7   148.77   240.06      388      100 | 
     |        Jiangxi   128.27   113.89   139.34   167.41   132.03    243.9 | 
     |       Shandong   124.28   113.39   144.76   242.54   207.32   188.89 | 
     |----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
     |          Henan   127.64   118.05   133.15   175.05   190.55      200 | 
     |          Hubei   123.94   115.01   144.19   171.65    92.86    47.37 | 
     |          Hunan   125.78   119.82   127.85   182.95   151.22   151.72 | 
     |      Guangdong   129.49    122.3   138.72   153.42   142.64   136.29 | 
     |        Guangxi      122   114.61   128.36   140.58   144.11   145.69 | 
     |----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
     |         Hainan   129.43   117.22   129.88   200.31   204.76   366.67 | 
     |      Chongqing    113.8   111.91   112.28      143   155.88   154.55 | 
     |        Sichuan   112.98   113.67   109.01   123.34      128   112.64 | 
     |        Guizhou    126.2   109.39   146.89   174.33   169.03   154.12 | 
     |         Yunnan   113.61   108.88    116.5   138.93   128.57   137.76 | 
     |----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
     |          Tibet   100.08   107.75    96.61    98.86    78.26    91.03 | 
     |        Shaanxi    116.1   114.42    116.9   144.97   142.42      400 | 
     |          Gansu   124.79   118.15   131.84   150.34   127.27   225.93 | 
     |        Qinghai   112.69   107.86   115.53   133.33   116.67   115.22 | 
     |        Ningxia   114.36   107.26   121.52   125.29   149.06      165 | 
     |----------------------------------------------------------------------| 
     |       Xinjiang   105.56   106.22   103.35   108.82   108.49    91.86 | 
     +----------------------------------------------------------------------+ 
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2.2 What Determines the SRB Level? 
In this part, we will analyze the data collected from tabulations on provinces and counties 
of the 2010 census(NSB, 2010); to find out what determines SRB differentials across 
provinces and counties; and how cultural, socioeconomic characteristics affect the levels 
of SRB, with a special focus on education‟s effects.  
2.2.1 The Variables 
Our first dependent variable is SRB. Besides, we also use SRB_1 and SRB_2 as 
dependent variables, and include the explanatory variables into the models exactly as 
those in the SRB models.  
The reasons for our interests in SRB_1 and SRB_2 include: (1) China‟s one-child and 
1.5-child policy have determined that most Chinese families can only have one or two 
children, so SRB of the first two orders are relevant with the majority Chinese families; 
(2) Many studies have pointed out that such policies are responsible for the inordinate 
SRB (Ebenstein, 2010; Zhu et al., 2009) because the distortion of the first two orders 
contribute the most part to the excess male births in China; (3) The correlation (see Table 
2.3 and Table 2.4) shows the similar result that the first orders are highly correlated with 
SRB. These inspire us to examine the determinants of the first two orders of SRB. And to 
find out if the determinations of them are the same.  
Table 2.3 Correlation between SRB and its Orders (Provincial Data) 
             |      srb    srb_1    srb_2    srb_3    srb_4 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
         srb |   1.0000 
       srb_1 |   0.6888   1.0000 
       srb_2 |   0.8217   0.2735   1.0000 
       srb_3 |   0.4685   0.0468   0.7132   1.0000 
       srb_4 |   0.0204  -0.1858   0.3191   0.6460   1.0000 
----------------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
Table 2.4 Correlation between SRB and its Orders (County Data) 
             |      srb    srb_1    srb_2    srb_3    srb_4 
-------------+--------------------------------------------- 
         srb |   1.0000 
       srb_1 |   0.5334   1.0000 
       srb_2 |   0.7766   0.0520   1.0000 
       srb_3 |   0.3190  -0.0794   0.3493   1.0000 
       srb_4 |   0.1274  -0.0178   0.0505   0.0365   1.0000 
------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Explanatory variables are specified as following: 
(1)Total fertility rate (denoted as “tfr” in the models) 
The hypothesis is SRB is higher when fertility is low. The reason is couples are more 
likely to use manipulative technology to get the sex of the child their desired. For 
example, if a couple decides to have only one child, then with certain degree of son 
preference they would want to have a son. The values of total fertility rate for each 
province and each county are listed in Table 6-4 from the long-form dataset(NSB, 2010).  
(2)The percentage of population who are minorities (“minority”) 
The family planning policy in China has less strict control over the fertility behavior of 
people who are not Han-nationality. And we assume that most non-Han ethnic groups do 
not have son preference in their culture, or their son preference is not as strong as Han 
group. So they would not as desperate as Han people to manipulate children‟s sex. 
Therefore, we expect that regions with higher composition of minority population will 
have a lower SRB. The information on ethnic composition of total population is available 
in Table 1-6 from the general dataset(NSB, 2010). We calculate the variable as the 
number of non-Han population divided by the total population in that region, times 100 
(to get the percentage).   
(3)The percentage of multigenerational households (“multgen”)  
Young couples who live with parents, usually husband‟s parents, are more likely under 
the pressure to at least have a son to for the continuity of the family line. Therefore, we 
assume regions with higher percentage of multigenerational households will have a 
higher SRB. We find such information from Table 1-11 from the general dataset (NSB, 
2010). We just sum the percentages of three-generational and four-generational 
households, and assign it to our variable. Note that households with five generations 
living together are very few in each regions, and even smaller in percentage, so we 
neglect it.   
(4)The percentage of urban population (“urban”)  
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We assume that of modernization and urbanization will reduce people‟s preference for 
sons, as is happening in South Korea. And the proportion of urban residents is a plausible 
index to measure the degree of urbanization. Therefore, we expect regions with higher 
proportion of urban residents will have lower SRBs. Such information can be found in 
Table 1-5 from the general dataset(NSB, 2010).  The percentage of non-rural population 
is directly list in the table.  
(5)Percentage of elderly (above 65) who rely on family support (“fs”)  
Traditionally, it is sons‟ duty to take care of parents when they grow older. This is an 
important reason that sons are more valuable for parents and therefore more preferred. In 
this sense, we think this variable contains some information on how many families are 
still adhere to such traditional elderly support form. On the other hand, we also assume 
that elderly will not rely on the support from their family if they have other source of 
income, such as pension. In this sense, the variable can also indicates the public elderly 
supports provided by the local government. If there is a good universal pension system 
for the elderly, then the traditional family support is not necessary and the economic 
reason for son preference will be much weakened. Therefore, we assume that regions 
with lower percentage of the elderly people who rely on family support, will have lower 
SRBs. Such information is available in Table 8-6 from the long-form dataset(NSB, 2010). 
The table lists the population of age 65 and above, and the number of them who rely on 
supports from family members. So we can calculate the percentages to get values for our 
variable.  
(6)The percentage elderly (above 60) require daily care (“care”) 
Due to the traditional elderly support form, going to nursing home is still not the first 
option for most Chinese elderly people. Besides, the number of nursing homes and the 
general quality of nursing staff are still not met by the demand(Chu & Chi, 2008). 
Therefore, we assume it is still the family members who take care of the unhealthy 
elderly, and this means an extra burden to the families. And this will account for large 
amount of family resources that could have been used for raising the next generation. 
Therefore, young couples will tend to have fewer children, and given some degree of son 
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preference they are more likely to manipulate child‟s sex. Therefore, we assume regions 
with larger percentage of unhealthy in the elderly group will have higher SRBs. 
Information on this can be found in Table 8-1 from the long-form dataset(NSB, 2010). 
(7)Percentage of population who have migrated more than 6 months (“migration”)  
Since large scale of migration will help the new ideas to spread faster through the entire 
population. In China, famers migrating from rural areas and working in the cities is a 
phenomenon lasting for about 20 decades. It is a very important demographic 
phenomenon and consists of a separate category in the 2010 census data. For the variable 
here, we use Table 1-3from the general dataset(NSB, 2010), in which the percentage of 
population who have migrated for longer than 6 months is listed. “Have migrated for 
more than 6 months” means that those people were not living in the place they were 
registered in, at the point the census was conducted, and had been away from home for 
more than 6 months, for various reasons.  And we assume regions with higher percentage 
of migration people will have a lower SRB, due to the diffusion of new gender norm 
against traditional son preference.        
(8)Education  
The variable we are most interested in is education. We use three variables to describe the 
education status of each region: Average years of schooling (this is the overall average 
including both male and female and denoted as “ays”), Female deviation from the overall 
average years of schooling (“fays”) and Male deviation from the overall average years of 
schooling (“mays”). The first variable describes the general educational level of the 
population, and the later variables describe the relative education level of female and 
male groups in the same region. The background information for these variables are 
found in Table 1-8 from the general dataset(NSB, 2010).  
In Table 1-8, there are 7 categories under the item “education”: none-education, primary, 
junior high school, senior high school, college, university and graduate. And it presents 
the sums of population under each category, with the overall as well as sex-specific sums.  
Based on these, we can compute for the percentages of people under each category, both 
the overall and sex-specific ones. In this way, we can get the education composition (in 
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percentages) for the entire population in that region and the separate education 
compositions for female and male.   
We then convert the 7 categories of education into “years of schooling” by the standard 
years that will it takes to complete that level of education. For “none-education” the 
number of years of schooling is obviously 0. For “primary”, it means 6 years of schooling. 
To complete “junior high school”, it usually takes 9 years. And for “senior high school”, 
it means 12 years. For “college”, it usually takes another 3 years, so it means 15 years of 
schooling in total. It takes usually 4 years to complete a Bachelor degree in China, so the 
total years of schooling for a Bachelor are 16 years. Students usually study for 3 years in 
graduate schools to get a Master degree, and another 3 years to get a PhD. Since the 
original tabulation includes the Masters and PhDs in one group, for simplicity we assume 
all observations are have Master degrees, which means years of schooling for the highest 
category “graduate” are 19.  
Then we can calculate the “average years of schooling” across the population for each 
region (“ays”), as well as that among the female population (ays_f) and the male 
population (ays_m). To describe the relative education levels of female and male. We 
generate two variables called “female deviation from the overall average years of 
schooling” (“fays”) and “male deviation from the overall average years of schooling” 
(“mays”). The calculation is simple. We subtract “ays_f” by “ays” to get “fays”; and 
subtract “ays_m” by “ays” to get “mays”. These education variables are candidate 
explanatory variables, but we need to examine their correlations before we include them 
into our models.  
We can see from Table 2.5, the average female education is lower than the overall level, 
while the male education is higher than the overall level in all provinces. But we can still 
find some regional differentials. People in Beijing and Shanghai have the highest level of 
education. They have 11.35 and 10.17 years of schooling on average. People from Tibet 
and Guizhou have fewest years of schooling, 4.67 and 6.84 respectively. And in the 
majority of provinces, people have 7-9 years of schooling on average. As to the sex 
differentials, we find that women from Beijing, Tianjin, Liaoning, Jilin and Xinjiang have 
the least deviation from the overall average. That means male and female are more equal 
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in terms of education. But in Anhui, Hainan, Guizhou, Tibet and Gansu, we observe that 
men are much more privileged than women in terms of education.           
(9)Socioeconomic variable 
The relationship between the socioeconomic levels and birth masculinity has been 
studied by many scholars(Attané, 2009; Chung & Das Gupta, 2007; Guilmoto & Ren, 
2011) Some of them use one or several variable as proxy for the general socioeconomic 
status(Attané, 2009; Chung & Das Gupta, 2007). Such way of modeling socioeconomic 
status is too simple and the variables cannot describe regions‟ socioeconomic status well 
enough. Guilmoto and Ren (2011) use a synthesized socioeconomic variable and find out 
the inverted “U” relationship between SRB and socioeconomic status. But they include 
education as a part of the socioeconomic status. In this thesis, we want to study the effect 
of education on SRB, as an independent explanatory variable. We also wonder if 
education is still a significant variable when socioeconomic status is already incorporated 
into the model. 
We use sector and occupation data from Table 4-4 and Table 4-7 from the long-form 
dataset(NSB, 2010), to construct our socioeconomic variable. There are 20 categories for 
sector and 7 categories for occupation. In these tables we can find the number of people 
for each of these categories. We apply standard Principle Component Analysis(Jolliffe, 
2005) to construct a synthetic index for socioeconomic status, so that each region has a 
socioeconomic score. The Principle Component Analysis is a data reduction method 
which is used to re-express multivariate data with fewer dimensions. These dimensions 
should capture the maximum possible information (variation) from the original variables. 
We start with finding the eigenvectors and eigenvalues of the correlation matrix of the 
original variables, and then rank them from the highest to the lowest eigenvalues. The 
eigenvector attached with the highest eigenvalue covers the most information of the 
correlation matrix. The eigenvector with the next highest eigenvalue contains less 
information than the first one. Then we know how much they together can explain the 
variance of the original variables. If they can explain at least 50% of the variance, then 
we consider using the scores computed based on them is as good as using the original 
variables. In our provincial data and county level data, we find the first components can 
explain over 50% of the variance of the original variables. Thus we can compute the 
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socioeconomic score for each region from the 27 original variables, without losing 
important information about the observations. With this computation, the overall 
socioeconomic status of a region is denoted by a single score, while higher score means 
higher socioeconomic status (see Table 2.5).    
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Table 2.5 Education and Socioeconomic Status of provinces 
province ays ays_f ays_m fays mays pca
Beijing 11.46 11.35 11.57 -0.11 0.11 15.27
Tianjin 10.10 9.95 10.23 -0.15 0.13 5.60
Hebei 8.83 8.58 9.07 -0.25 0.24 -2.91
Shanxi 9.17 8.97 9.35 -0.20 0.19 0.01
Inner Mongolia 8.93 8.63 9.21 -0.31 0.28 0.64
Liaoning 9.40 9.21 9.59 -0.19 0.19 1.56
Jilin 9.24 9.06 9.40 -0.17 0.17 -0.85
Heilongjiang 9.11 8.93 9.29 -0.19 0.18 -0.35
Shanghai 10.50 10.17 10.82 -0.33 0.31 10.42
Jiangsu 9.08 8.59 9.56 -0.48 0.48 2.05
Zhejiang 8.57 8.17 8.96 -0.41 0.39 2.53
Anhui 8.08 7.49 8.66 -0.59 0.58 -1.79
Fujian 8.76 8.30 9.20 -0.46 0.44 1.80
Jiangxi 8.52 8.04 8.99 -0.48 0.46 -1.27
Shandong 8.71 8.23 9.19 -0.48 0.47 -2.27
Henan 8.61 8.29 8.94 -0.32 0.32 -3.88
Hubei 8.96 8.50 9.40 -0.46 0.44 -1.16
Hunan 8.86 8.57 9.14 -0.29 0.28 -2.11
Guangdong 9.18 8.83 9.51 -0.35 0.32 1.32
Guangxi 8.40 8.06 8.72 -0.34 0.32 -3.48
Hainan 8.85 8.34 9.30 -0.50 0.45 -0.53
Chongqing 8.49 8.19 8.78 -0.29 0.29 -0.20
Sichuan 8.12 7.78 8.45 -0.34 0.33 -2.49
Guizhou 7.41 6.84 7.95 -0.57 0.54 -3.69
Yunnan 7.54 7.15 7.89 -0.38 0.36 -3.85
Tibet 5.25 4.67 5.79 -0.57 0.54 -4.10
Shaanxi 9.07 8.72 9.39 -0.35 0.33 -0.96
Gansu 7.96 7.41 8.50 -0.55 0.53 -3.80
Qinghai 7.58 7.06 8.06 -0.52 0.48 -0.82
Ningxia 8.44 8.02 8.85 -0.42 0.40 0.19
Xinjiang 8.85 8.74 8.96 -0.11 0.11 -0.88  
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Table 2.6 Variable Descriptions with Provincial and County level data 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
tfr               Total fertility rate 
minority          Percentage of population with non-han nationality 
migration         Percentage of population who migrate longer than 6 months 
urban             Percentage of population with urban Hukou 
multgen           Multigenerational household 
care              Percentage of above 60 who require daily care 
fs                Percentage of above 65 population rely on family member support 
ays               Average years of schooling 
ays2              Squared average years of education 
ays_f             Average years of schooling for female 
ays_f2              Squared female average years of education 
ays_m             Average years of schooling for male 
mays              Male deviation from the overall average years of schooling 
fays              Female deviation from the overall average years of schooling 
pca                          Socioeconomic status (PCA) 
pca2              Squared Socioeconomic status 
srb               Sex ratio at birth 
srb_1             Sex ratio at birth_first children 
srb_2             Sex ratio at birth_second children 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Table 2.7  Descriptive Statistics of Variables (Provincial Data) 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         tfr |        31    1186.284    287.0408      706.7    1789.75 
    minority |        31    14.91964     21.3172   .2622276   91.83046 
   migration |        31    19.43677    5.755417       5.31      29.72 
       urban |        31    31.93226    12.56511      14.77      61.89 
     multgen |        31     17.4929    4.714753       9.52      25.22 
        care |        31    3.154652    .7383287   1.797652   5.449395 
          fs |        31    46.82114    12.78878   5.199708   63.06847 
         ays |        31    8.710771    1.040049   5.246712    11.4606 
       ays_f |        31    8.350276    1.137241   4.674943   11.34662 
       ays_m |        31    9.054971    .9577858    5.78741   11.56756 
        mays |        31    .3442005    .1366138   .1066551   .5805206 
        fays |        31   -.3604952    .1420931    -.59059  -.1139822 
         pca |        31    2.34e-09    4.132688  -4.102504   15.26901 
         srb |        31    118.3897    7.707074     100.08     131.07 
       srb_1 |        31    112.4832     4.22548     106.22      122.3 
       srb_2 |        31    126.1516    15.80838      96.61     168.32 
        ays2 |        31    76.92434    17.72131   27.52799   131.3454 
      ays_f2 |        31     70.9787     18.6179    21.8551   128.7458 
        pca2 |        31    16.52817    44.78749    .000192   233.1428 
----------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 2.8  Descriptive Statistics of Variables (County Data) 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         tfr |      1069    1298.694    394.9167     447.64    4029.81 
    minority |      1069    11.91129    24.30011          0    98.8628 
   migration |      1069    20.27996    9.240628       2.59      95.64 
       urban |      1069    27.05418    20.12846       3.83      93.75 
     multgen |      1069    20.06116    8.265498        .83      84.31 
        care |      1069    3.034576    1.798435          0   29.20792 
          fs |      1069    52.51631     16.6671          0   88.93113 
         ays |      1067    8.382933    1.269001       3.84      12.84 
       ays_f |      1068    7.931657    1.361677       3.04      12.56 
       ays_m |      1068    8.815974    1.197073       4.15      13.12 
        mays |      1067    .4313308    .1679356        .01       1.13 
        fays |      1067   -.4533271     .171137      -1.15       -.02 
         pca |      1066   -4.17e-10    3.619252  -5.101148   15.81012 
         srb |      1068    121.6089    23.90153          0        300 
       srb_1 |      1068    115.3689    31.00124          0        800 
       srb_2 |      1064    139.3649    56.47212         20        700 
        ays2 |      1067    71.88243    22.08099    14.7456   164.8656 
      ays_f2 |      1068    64.76361    22.52859     9.2416   157.7536 
        pca2 |      1066    13.08669    26.33133   .0000786   249.9599 
----------------------------------------------------------------------
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Table 2.9 Correlation Matrix of dependent and independent variables (provincial data) 
(obs=31) 
             |      tfr minority migrat~n    urban  multgen     care       fs      ays    ays_f    ays_m     mays     fays      pca 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         tfr |   1.0000 
    minority |   0.3470   1.0000 
   migration |   0.0224  -0.3411   1.0000 
       urban |  -0.6712  -0.2519   0.2305   1.0000 
     multgen |   0.4007   0.0496  -0.4237  -0.6940   1.0000 
        care |  -0.0725   0.5099  -0.2374   0.0565   0.0258   1.0000 
          fs |   0.5212   0.1647  -0.2774  -0.9139   0.7190  -0.1689   1.0000 
         ays |  -0.4943  -0.6589   0.3439   0.7684  -0.5357  -0.2631  -0.7147   1.0000 
       ays_f |  -0.5121  -0.6269   0.3069   0.7791  -0.5507  -0.2433  -0.7260   0.9955   1.0000 
       ays_m |  -0.4699  -0.6913   0.3819   0.7467  -0.5117  -0.2844  -0.6934   0.9940   0.9792   1.0000 
        mays |   0.4688   0.1695   0.0597  -0.6151   0.4907   0.0092   0.5793  -0.6440  -0.7136  -0.5567   1.0000 
        fays |  -0.4808  -0.1951  -0.0609   0.6114  -0.4869  -0.0215  -0.5798   0.6477   0.7172   0.5610  -0.9974   1.0000 
         pca |  -0.6179  -0.3131   0.4123   0.8003  -0.6177   0.1047  -0.7597   0.7780   0.7640   0.7838  -0.4279   0.4200   1.0000 
       
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
Table 2.10 Correlation Matrix of dependent and independent variables (county data) 
 
(obs=1064) 
 
             |      tfr minority migrat~n    urban  multgen     care       fs      ays    ays_f    ays_m     mays     fays      pca 
-------------+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
         tfr |   1.0000 
    minority |   0.2393   1.0000 
   migration |   0.1024  -0.2368   1.0000 
       urban |  -0.4364  -0.2166   0.1192   1.0000 
     multgen |   0.2391   0.2071  -0.4707  -0.4580   1.0000 
        care |   0.2420   0.4141  -0.1285  -0.2713   0.1352   1.0000 
          fs |   0.3988   0.1943  -0.0896  -0.7867   0.4857   0.1525   1.0000 
         ays |  -0.3589  -0.4229   0.1529   0.5055  -0.2894  -0.4258  -0.4615   1.0000 
       ays_f |  -0.3642  -0.4071   0.1460   0.4951  -0.2917  -0.4164  -0.4610   0.9940   1.0000 
       ays_m |  -0.3487  -0.4397   0.1601   0.5101  -0.2808  -0.4328  -0.4545   0.9924   0.9734   1.0000 
        mays |   0.2275   0.0634  -0.0148  -0.1873   0.1865   0.1348   0.2508  -0.4860  -0.5760  -0.3751   1.0000 
        fays |  -0.2352  -0.1028   0.0255   0.1892  -0.1726  -0.1546  -0.2442   0.4916   0.5841   0.3842  -0.9770   1.0000 
         pca |  -0.5023  -0.2692   0.1958   0.8698  -0.4952  -0.3210  -0.7270   0.5495   0.5398   0.5537  -0.2089   0.2180   1.0000 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
27 
 
2.2.2 Multiple Regression Model 
 
We first regress SRB on the explanatory variables we specified above. Then we regress 
srb_1 and srb_2, using exactly the same explanatory variables on the right hand side 
(RHS) of the equations. The reason we model in this way is we assume all the RHS 
variable have some explaining power for both SRB and its first two orders. And we 
expect these variables have different effects on SRB and its first two orders. Models 
specified in this way will make comparison feasible and easy to interpret. The multiple 
regression models are specified as following: 
            
       
Where, i=1,…n (n denotes the number of observations) 
m=0, 1, 2. For m=0 the dependent variable is SRB; m =1 the dependent variable is 
SRR_1; m=2 the dependent variable is SRB_2 
   are the explanatory variable vectors, with  h=1, 2, 3, 4, 5 denoting there are five 
vectors of explanatory variables for each dependent variable.  
To lower the risk of multicollinearity, we exclude some variables from the models. For 
example, with provincial data (see Table 2.9), “urban” and “fs” are highly correlated with 
education variables and socioeconomic score (“pca”), therefore are excluded from the 
models. We observe that correlation between “pca” and education variables are also high, 
therefore we should avoid modeling them into the same equation.     for models with 
provincial data are specified as following: 
  = ( 1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr pca pca2 ) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr  ays  ays2) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr  ays  ays2 ays_f) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr  ays_f  ays_f2) 
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With county data (see Table 2.10), we also find the correlations between “fs”, “urban” 
and “pca” are high, so it is better to leave them out of our models. But we do not observe 
high correlations between “pca” and education variables, therefore we can include them 
in the same models.     for models with county data are specified as following: 
  = ( 1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr  pca  pca2 ) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr  pca  ays ) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr  pca  ays ays2) 
  = (1  migration  care  multgen  minority  tfr  pca  ays_f  ays_f2) 
    are the coefficient vectors, whose elements are corresponding to the h-th 
explanatory variables/equation for the m-th dependent variable. The number of elements 
in the vector depends on which explanatory variable vector is using in the regression. 
     are the disturbances. It denote the disturbance in the h-th equation for the m-th 
dependent variable.  
According to Hill, Griffiths and Lim(2008), our multiple regression models have the 
following assumptions: 
(1)  (    | )    
(2)    (         )             
(3)    (    | )     
  
(4)                                                   . 
(5)                                                          . 
For regressions with provincial data, the number of observations is 31. But for those with 
the county level data, the number of observations can vary slightly from equation to 
equation. The reason is for some variable that are included in the models, we do not have 
data for it in some counties. Or there are some statistic errors in the original tables from 
the dataset.  
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2.2.3 Findings and Discussions 
 
Results with the provincial data 
Table 2.11 Multiple Regression on SRB with Provincial Data 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
                 srb          srb          srb          srb          srb    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
migration     0.0487      0.00495      -0.0932       -0.189       -0.103    
             (0.170)      (0.182)      (0.145)      (0.136)      (0.140)    
 
care          -2.722*      -3.908*      -5.544***    -4.926***    -5.644*** 
             (1.269)      (1.548)      (1.298)      (1.197)      (1.255)    
 
multgen        0.338        0.345     -0.00512      -0.0175      -0.0295    
             (0.214)      (0.243)      (0.228)      (0.206)      (0.218)    
 
minority      -0.208***    -0.194**     -0.355***    -0.290***    -0.361*** 
            (0.0520)     (0.0535)     (0.0656)     (0.0648)     (0.0600)    
 
tfr           0.0138***    0.0141**     0.0216***    0.0185***    0.0213*** 
           (0.00358)    (0.00421)    (0.00359)    (0.00347)    (0.00339)    
 
pca                        -0.183                                           
                          (0.526)                                           
 
pca2                       0.0412                                           
                         (0.0387)                                           
 
ays                                     -32.46***    -5.238                 
                                       (8.542)      (13.34)                 
 
ays2                                     1.791**      1.326**               
                                       (0.477)      (0.469)                 
 
ays_f                                                -17.12*      -28.10*** 
                                                    (6.850)      (6.771)    
 
ays_f2                                                             1.598*** 
                                                                 (0.396)    
 
_cons          106.8***     110.0***     262.5***     206.9***     240.1*** 
             (6.881)      (8.193)      (41.77)      (43.76)      (32.36)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                 31           31           31           31           31    
adj. R-sq      0.711        0.709        0.807        0.843        0.822    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
. 
We find that socioeconomic status (pca) and its quadratic form are not significant while 
other variables are in the model. In factual P-values for variable “pca” and “pca2” 
(squared pca) are 0.73 and 0.3 (not shown in Table 2.9), far below any significance level. 
Therefor with provincial data, we do not found the inverted “U” socioeconomic effect 
suggested by Guilmoto and Ren‟s studies (2011). But we find that education‟s effect is 
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significant. In the third model, we include both “ays” and its quadratic form “ays2” and 
find significant negative coefficients, indicating a nonlinear effect of education on SRB. 
The estimated partial effect of education when “ays”=9 can be calculated as:  
    
    
|                          . That mean if the average years of 
schooling increase from 8.5 to 9.5, then SRB is expected to decline by16.35 while other 
variables are held constant. Such negative partial effect of education on SRB is expected 
to be effective until       , i.e. everyone has a Master degree. It also implies such 
negative effect is more prominent when education increases from a lower level. After we 
add female education “ays_f”, the nonlinear effect is still significant and the coefficient to 
“ays_f” is also significant. It means educational level of female has a significant negative 
effect on SRB. One year increase in female relative education will lead to a decline in 
SRB by 17.12. Then we include both female education and its quadratic form into the 
model. And we observe a significant negative nonlinear relation between female 
education and SRB. Such nonlinear relation is very similar to that between the overall 
education and SRB, only with smaller magnitude. Besides, the results show that SRB is 
increasing in fertility. This is the opposite as we expected. We assumed lower fertility 
would increase SRB. Large percentage of minority in the population is on average 
associated with a lower SRB. The effect of “care” is also against our hypothesis. We 
expected that increase in elderly people who need daily care will cut down family sources 
that would have been used to raise another child; and a lower fertility should be 
associated with a higher SRB. But our data shows percentage of elderly who requires 
daily care is expected to lower SRB. And as we expected, SRB is decreasing in higher 
minority composition in the population. 
  
Table 2.12 Multiple Regression on SRB_1 with Provincial Data 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
               srb_1        srb_1        srb_1        srb_1        srb_1    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
migration    -0.0869      -0.0474       -0.110      -0.0864       -0.108    
             (0.123)      (0.133)      (0.132)      (0.139)      (0.132)    
 
care          -2.457*      -2.668*      -3.027*      -3.181*      -3.087*   
             (0.919)      (1.136)      (1.183)      (1.226)      (1.188)    
 
multgen        0.396*       0.305        0.356        0.359        0.366    
             (0.155)      (0.178)      (0.208)      (0.211)      (0.206)    
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minority     -0.0588      -0.0630      -0.0798      -0.0962      -0.0780    
            (0.0376)     (0.0392)     (0.0597)     (0.0663)     (0.0568)    
 
tfr        -0.000458     -0.00220      0.00106      0.00182      0.00111    
           (0.00260)    (0.00309)    (0.00327)    (0.00355)    (0.00321)    
 
pca                        -0.425                                           
                          (0.386)                                           
 
pca2                       0.0227                                           
                         (0.0284)                                           
 
ays                                     -6.045       -12.84                 
                                       (7.786)      (13.66)                 
 
ays2                                     0.346        0.462                 
                                       (0.435)      (0.480)                 
 
ays_f                                                 4.276       -5.356    
                                                    (7.015)      (6.406)    
 
ays_f2                                                             0.323    
                                                                 (0.375)    
 
_cons          116.4***     119.7***     143.9***     157.8**      139.5*** 
             (4.983)      (6.009)      (38.07)      (44.82)      (30.62)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                 31           31           31           31           31    
adj. R-sq      0.495        0.479        0.466        0.451        0.469    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
. 
For SRB of the first order, neither education variables nor socioeconomic variables seem 
to be significant. The only significant coefficient is found with “care”. It has negative 
effect on SRB_1, similar to the effect on SRB but at a lower significance level and 
smaller magnitude. Such result indicates that our model is not very realistic in modeling 
the determination of SRB_1. 
 
               Table 2.13  Multiple Regression on SRB_2 with Provincial Data 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
               srb_2        srb_2        srb_2        srb_2        srb_2    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
migration      0.480        0.181      0.00345       -0.355      -0.0201    
             (0.516)      (0.520)      (0.397)      (0.324)      (0.383)    
 
care         -0.0669       -4.983       -9.921*      -7.602*      -10.09**  
             (3.843)      (4.427)      (3.560)      (2.847)      (3.439)    
 
multgen       0.0499        0.311       -1.044       -1.090*      -1.126    
             (0.649)      (0.695)      (0.626)      (0.490)      (0.596)    
 
minority      -0.424*      -0.351*      -0.908***    -0.661***    -0.925*** 
             (0.157)      (0.153)      (0.180)      (0.154)      (0.164)    
 
tfr           0.0264*      0.0321*      0.0532***    0.0416***    0.0518*** 
            (0.0109)     (0.0120)    (0.00984)    (0.00824)    (0.00930)    
 
pca                         0.214                                           
                          (1.504)                                           
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pca2                        0.133                                           
                          (0.111)                                           
 
ays                                     -111.5***    -9.351                 
                                       (23.43)      (31.73)                 
 
ays2                                     6.199***     4.453***              
                                       (1.309)      (1.116)                 
 
ays_f                                                -64.27***    -95.17*** 
                                                    (16.29)      (18.55)    
 
ays_f2                                                             5.444*** 
                                                                 (1.086)    
 
_cons          91.12***     97.94***     620.8***     412.2***     538.7*** 
             (20.84)      (23.42)      (114.6)      (104.1)      (88.65)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N                 31           31           31           31           31    
adj. R-sq      0.369        0.435        0.655        0.789        0.682    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
. 
Socioeconomic scores still do not affect the sex ratio of birth. But we observe a very 
strong effect of education on reducing SRB_2, much stronger than it has on SRB. The 
estimated partial effect of education when “ays”=9 can be calculated as:  
      
    
|      
                  . It means if the average years of schooling increase from 8.5 
to 9.5, then SRB for the second order is expected to decline by 55.7 while other variables 
are held constant. This is an extraordinarily big effect. And it is effective until ays = 18. 
The nonlinear pattern is not significant. Female education also seems to have such effect, 
only with smaller magnitude. The reason that education has such effect on reducing the 
male births among the second children, is higher education reduces people‟s son 
preference thus sex-selection on children is less prevailed.  
Besides, we find higher total fertility rate is associated with a higher SRB_2. Provinces 
with larger minority people tend to have lower SRB_2. And provinces with large care 
demand from the elderly, are expected to have lower SRB_2s.  
 
Results for the county-level data 
Table 2.14 Multiple Regression on SRB with County-Level Data 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
                 srb          srb          srb          srb          srb    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
migration      0.182        0.206*       0.205*       0.203*       0.201*   
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            (0.0974)     (0.0973)     (0.0972)     (0.0972)     (0.0971)    
 
care          -0.743       -1.101*      -1.251**     -1.371**     -1.409**  
             (0.448)      (0.462)      (0.465)      (0.487)      (0.484)    
 
multgen       0.0422       -0.116       -0.108       -0.110       -0.115    
             (0.105)      (0.116)      (0.112)      (0.112)      (0.112)    
 
minority      -0.127***    -0.131***    -0.144***    -0.157***    -0.159*** 
            (0.0341)     (0.0343)     (0.0352)     (0.0381)     (0.0375)    
 
tfr          0.00546**    0.00193      0.00178      0.00165      0.00150    
           (0.00205)    (0.00225)    (0.00224)    (0.00224)    (0.00224)    
 
pca                        -1.091**     -0.786**     -0.830**     -0.818**  
                          (0.403)      (0.284)      (0.289)      (0.287)    
 
pca2                       0.0168                                           
                         (0.0441)                                           
 
ays                                     -1.326       -5.855                 
                                       (0.741)      (5.442)                 
 
ays2                                                  0.256                 
                                                    (0.304)                 
 
ays_f                                                             -5.636    
                                                                 (4.567)    
 
ays_f2                                                             0.247    
                                                                 (0.269)    
 
_cons          113.7***     122.0***     134.0***     154.3***     152.8*** 
             (3.717)      (4.351)      (8.077)      (25.53)      (20.70)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               1068         1065         1063         1063         1064    
adj. R-sq      0.032        0.042        0.044        0.044        0.046    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
. 
Note that even though our county sample size is 1069, but due to missing values for some 
variables, we lost a few but not many observations (at most 6 are lost in above 
estimations). The reason could be statistic mistake or some extreme situations. For 
example, a very small county (an island) in Hainan province did not have births during 
the observation time period of the 2010 census. Therefore, its SRBs are missing.  
Results from the county-level data indicate a significant socioeconomic effect on SRB. 
Counties with higher socioeconomic scores are associated with lower SRB. For one unit 
increase on socioeconomic score, the county is expected to have a decline on SRB by 
about 1. We notice that even though the effect is statistically significant, it is not a strong 
effect.  Referring to Table 2.3, we find that except for some big cities like Beijing and 
Shanghai (who “pca” scores are 15.27 and 10.42) most provinces have scores between 1 
and 4. Since county is the lowest administrative level in China, and most counties are not 
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as developed as cities, we can expect their “pca” scores would group in the range 1 and 4. 
It means for one unit increase on “pca” score, the sector and occupation structure should 
have a substantial transformation and upgrade. Therefore, we admit economic 
development can gradually reduce the SRB in that region, but it may take much efforts 
and possibly much time to attain that effect. Hence, it is not efficient to rely on economic 
development for its negative effect on SRB.   
Education variables lost significance with our county data. Total fertility rate (tfr) is no 
longer significant but “minority” is still significant.  And “care” also stands out as a 
significant factor: counties with higher proportion elderly who require daily care are 
expected to have lower SRBs.  
 
In the determination of SRB_1 (Table2.13) we find neither socioeconomic status nor 
education have significant effects.  “care” has opposite sign as it does in the SRB model. 
As we assumed, large demand of daily care from the elderly increases family burden, and 
will decrease the number of births and thus end up with higher SRB given some degree of 
son preference. 
 
Table 2.15 Multiple Regression on SRB_1 with County-Level Data 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
               srb_1        srb_1        srb_1        srb_1        srb_1    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
migration     0.0930       0.0996       0.0957        0.100       0.0992    
             (0.128)      (0.128)      (0.128)      (0.128)      (0.128)    
 
care           1.527**      1.695**      1.458*       1.816**      1.742**  
             (0.587)      (0.610)      (0.615)      (0.642)      (0.639)    
 
multgen       0.0753        0.147        0.105        0.108        0.109    
             (0.137)      (0.153)      (0.148)      (0.148)      (0.148)    
 
minority      -0.144**     -0.134**     -0.150**     -0.114*      -0.122*   
            (0.0447)     (0.0453)     (0.0465)     (0.0503)     (0.0496)    
 
tfr          0.00151      0.00241      0.00192      0.00233      0.00222    
           (0.00268)    (0.00296)    (0.00295)    (0.00296)    (0.00296)    
 
pca                         0.589        0.298        0.430        0.448    
                          (0.532)      (0.375)      (0.381)      (0.380)    
 
pca2                      -0.0612                                           
                         (0.0582)                                           
 
ays                                     -0.891        12.62                 
                                       (0.980)      (7.182)                 
 
ays2                                                 -0.762                 
                                                    (0.401)                 
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ays_f                                                              9.204    
                                                                 (6.033)    
 
ays_f2                                                            -0.610    
                                                                 (0.355)    
 
_cons          107.1***     104.6***     113.8***     53.09        71.02**  
             (4.877)      (5.741)      (10.68)      (33.69)      (27.34)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               1068         1065         1063         1063         1064    
adj. R-sq      0.009        0.008        0.008        0.010        0.010    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In the determination of SRB_2 (Table 2.14), we find socioeconomic status is an 
irrelevant factor. And the nonlinear effect of education is significant. It means counties 
with better education tend to have a much lower SRB among the second children. We can 
calculate the partial effect of education: 
      
    
|                          . 
Even though the effect is much smaller than that suggested with provincial data, it is 
discernable and relatively large. Similar effect is found with female education. Therefore, 
according to our data, improvement in people‟s education will substantially reduce SRB 
for the second order.  
Besides, migration seems to be an important factor. Large population mobility is 
associated with higher SRB on the second births. The effect was the opposite as we 
supposed.  We assumed large population mobility will help the new gender norm to 
spread across population and thus reduce son preference and result in lower SRB. But 
here, works in different ways. Minority is still significant in decrease SRB for the second 
order. The sign of variable “care” here is negative again. It means counties with higher 
proportion elderly who require daily care tend to have lower SRBs among all the second 
births, and such effect is robust even though other variables are considered.  
Table 2.16 Multiple Regression on SRB_2 with County-Level Data 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
                 (1)          (2)          (3)          (4)          (5)    
               srb_2        srb_2        srb_2        srb_2        srb_2    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
migration      0.480*       0.503*       0.497*       0.488*       0.482*   
             (0.234)      (0.234)      (0.234)      (0.234)      (0.234)    
 
care          -2.191*      -2.602*      -2.994**     -3.839**     -3.828**  
             (1.073)      (1.113)      (1.117)      (1.170)      (1.163)    
 
multgen       -0.133       -0.350       -0.358       -0.367       -0.384    
             (0.250)      (0.277)      (0.268)      (0.268)      (0.268)    
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minority      -0.169*      -0.168*      -0.203*      -0.286**     -0.281**  
            (0.0812)     (0.0820)     (0.0841)     (0.0909)     (0.0895)    
 
tfr          0.00275     -0.00222     -0.00283     -0.00363     -0.00394    
           (0.00491)    (0.00540)    (0.00538)    (0.00538)    (0.00538)    
 
pca                        -1.354       -0.962       -1.273       -1.212    
                          (0.963)      (0.680)      (0.690)      (0.687)    
 
pca2                     -0.00375                                           
                          (0.105)                                           
 
ays                                     -2.912       -33.64**               
                                       (1.777)      (13.00)                 
 
ays2                                                  1.736*                
                                                    (0.728)                 
 
ays_f                                                             -27.23*   
                                                                 (10.92)    
 
ays_f2                                                             1.421*   
                                                                 (0.644)    
 
_cons          137.5***     149.0***     176.1***     313.9***     281.4*** 
             (8.845)      (10.37)      (19.34)      (60.89)      (49.37)    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
N               1064         1061         1059         1059         1060    
adj. R-sq      0.021        0.023        0.025        0.030        0.030    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
. 
2.2.4 Discussions   
With provincial data, we find that education has significant and strong effect on reducing 
SRB. It is a nonlinear effect which will be effective until average education level reaches 
to a very high level. It also seems to have stronger effect when education improves from 
a lower level. We find that education has extraordinary negative on reducing the excess 
male births among the second children. One possible reason is higher education will 
reduce the son preference among people, and thus reduce the sex-selective abortion on 
the second births. Such effect is very meaningful since most distortion in SRB is from the 
abnormally high levels among the second births. If the education level can be 
improvement in the “1.5-child” regions, substantial reduce in second order SRB seems 
very promising.  
However with county data, we do not discern a significant effect of education, except for 
on the second order. It means if the average years of schooling increase from 8.5 to 9.5, 
then SRB for the second order is expected to decline by 17.98 while other variables are 
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held constant. It seems smaller compared by the result with provincial data. But we find 
this magnitude more realistic. And this finding testify what we found with provincial data, 
therefore, we consider education‟s negative effect on SRB is reliable.  
With both data, we find that female education works similarly as overall education on 
SRB and SRB_2. With provincial data, female education has a significant effect on 
reducing SRB. This effect is prominent for SRB and SRB_2. When women are better 
educated as men, they have better chance to participate in formal labor market and be 
economically independent. In a region where women show stronger competiveness and 
independency, people will show more respect to women and also daughters.  The other 
reason is the places where women are better educated coincide with those have lower son 
preference and thus lower SRBs. In either way, the connection between female education 
and SRB is very strong. Thus, improvement on female education is going to reduce both 
the overall SRB and the SRB for second order.  
Socioeconomic status of a region does not have much effect on its SRB level, suggested 
by provincial data. But it tends to show significant negative effect on SRB with county 
data. The negative is small even though it shows significance. And we think it is not 
efficient to rely on economic development for its negative effect on SRB.  The main 
reason is it takes much efforts and possibly much time to attain a substantial 
transformation and upgrade on the sector and occupation structure.  Therefore, we admit 
economic development can gradually reduce the SRB in that region, but question its 
efficiency.  
 
We find that migration/population mobility is an important factor for high SRB_2. Our 
earlier assumption was population mobility can help new social norms spread across 
population, reducing the overall son preference and therefore leads to a lower level of 
SRB. But with our data, it seems more population mobility is associated with higher 
SRB_2. One possible reason is largest composition of population migration finds among 
the rural residents migrating to big cities for job. They have strong son preference than 
urban people. And most of these people are under the “1.5-child” policy, people are most 
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likely to apply sex-selective abortion to ensure a boy as the second child. And currently 
living in the cities gives them better access to sex-selection services.  
Total fertility rate has a positive effect on SRB with provincial data but is not a 
significant factor suggested by county data. It implies that lower fertility is not the main 
reason for the rise in SRB.  
And both provincial data and county level data suggest substantial amount of SRB 
differentials can be explained by the composition of minority in the population. It is 
consistent with our expectation as generally speaking ethnic groups do not have strong 
preference for sons. And they are not constrained by the “one-child” or “1.5-child” policy. 
The burden from supporting the elderly family members also seems to be relevant for 
SRB differentials.  
Finally, such regional analyses have limitations. The main problem here is that we use the 
aggregate data to make inferences about relationships at the individual level. And the 
results we get from such analyses usually provide biased estimates(Steel, Tranmer, & 
Holt, 2006). Therefore, it seems analysis with individual data would be more reliable. 
 
2.2.5 Validity of the Estimation 
 
Multicollinearity 
We have included several explanatory variables into the models. There comes with a risk 
that some of them may have exact or high linear relationships. If this is the exact 
collinearity exists, then the least squares estimator is not defined. But it is not a usual case. 
More often, we may two or more explanatory variables have high but not exact linear 
dependencies. Even though these circumstances do not violate the least squares 
assumptions, and the least squares estimator is still the best linear unbiased estimator, the 
quality of the estimation can be poor. Estimates can be very sensitive for the inclusion or 
exclusion of some observations.  
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Our models do not seem to have such problem. First, Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 indicate 
that our explanatory variables do not have strong correlations in general. For those with 
high correlation, we chose very carefully. For example, we did not include “pca” and 
education variables into model together since they are highly correlated with provincial 
data (0.78). Second, in each of the regression results tables, we list the standard error for 
each coefficient and we do not observe any widely inflated standard errors. After each of 
the above regressions, we check for the problem of multicollinearity. Third, we applied 
multicollinearity test after the each regression to using the vif command in STATA.  
vif  is short for “variance inflation factor”. If a variable has VIF values larger than 10, 
then it may have a linear correlation with other independent variables and we should take 
a second thought whether or to include it into the model. Table 2.17 is an example. None 
of the variables has VIF value higher than 10. Multicollinearity is not a big problem for 
our models. Our estimations from the multiple regression models are in general stable.  
Table 2.17  Test for Multicollinearity 
    Variable |       VIF       1/VIF   
-------------+---------------------- 
         pca |      2.06    0.485664 
         ays |      1.72    0.581472 
     multgen |      1.66    0.601279 
         tfr |      1.52    0.655916 
   migration |      1.48    0.677966 
    minority |      1.42    0.706272 
        care |      1.35    0.739077 
-------------+---------------------- 
    Mean VIF |      1.60 
 
Errors in the data 
The reported number of births is not without query. Goodkind (2011) points out that 
approximately 19% of children at 0-4 ages were not reported by their parents during the 
2000 census. Among them there was excess underreporting of little girls, which rendered 
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the recorded SRB considerably higher than the actual level. China‟s birth planning 
system contributes to a rise in excess underreporting of daughters relative to sons. This is 
because violating the family planning policy means fines on parents. Therefore, they have 
motive to avoid reporting the new born child, especially when it is a girl. Many studies 
have analyzed such problem (Zhai & Yang, 2009) Some study points out that the main 
cause of increase in reported SRB in early 1990s, was underreporting of female 
births(Zeng et al., 1993).  
In this thesis, we do not test for such possibility because we believe that the census 
tabulations have sufficiently good quality. Besides, the levels of SRB are used as the 
dependent variable in our models. Some measurement errors in the dependent variable 
will not cause the least squares estimators to be inconsistent or biased.  
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3 Education and the degree of son preference-with 
CGSS data 
 
3.1 The CGSS Data  
The data we use in this part is from the “China General Social Survey（CGSS）” of 
2008. The survey was conducted under a research project called "China General Social 
Survey", which was sponsored by the China Social Science Foundation. This research 
project was carried out by Department of Sociology, Renmin University of China & 
Social Science Division, Hong Kong Science and Technology University, and directed by 
Dr. Li Lulu & Dr. Bian Yanjie (Yanjie & Lulu, 2008).  Before the one in 2008, they 
conducted four CGSS surveys in 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 respectively. In each of 
these surveys, samples with sizes up to ten thousand were randomly collected from urban 
and rural areas in China. These surveys cover many aspects of the informants‟ lives, 
including basic demographic information, education and work experience and even their 
opinions over some “Social hotspots”.  Data from 2003 to 2008 are all available now, 
which can be obtained for registered users (CGSS, 2008).  
The CGSS 2008 data we use in this thesis is collected from the most recent survey. There 
are 6000 observations in the sample. The sample is representative because it covers every 
province, having observations from both urban and rural areas. We have 3982 
observations from urban areas and 2018 observations from rural areas. The survey had 
respondents with great variety in age, level of education, occupation and other personal 
and household characteristics.  
The CGSS 2008 survey contains two questionnaires. Questionnaire A was designed to 
document respondents‟ basic information, like residence area, sex, age, education, 
employment status and job positions. By the end, there were a serial questions asking 
about respondents‟ current and previous experiences in education, work and other social 
and economic activities. Questionnaire B was designed to get information about 
respondents‟ attitudes over globalization and some controversial issues such as social 
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inequality and injustice. With these details, we hope to find out which characteristics, 
experience and attitudes of the respondents may define their family building-up behaviors.    
Besides, the survey was not aimed to investigate respondents‟ fertility behaviors and the 
conductor was not the government. So we suppose the respondents had less motivation to 
underreport the number of their children or cover up the sex composition of their children. 
We consider the information on birth behavior is less distorted than census data, and shall 
be accountable for our research.  
 
3.2 Basic information  
On average, the urban residents tend to have smaller family size than the rural residents. 
Since the one-child policy is only implemented in the cities, so the overall fertility is of 
course lower in the cities. On the other hand, the modern life style is usually associated 
with lower fertility as is observed in Japan and many developed European countries. So 
the spontaneous desire for smaller family is also a very important reason for lower 
fertility. Even though analyses on macro data suggest that lower fertility is not the main 
reason for the rise in SRB, we wonder if it is a critical factor at individual level. The 
frequencies of number of children from our sample are summarized in Figure 3.1. 
From the survey data we find among families with only one child, there are about 139 
boys to 100 girls. For families with two children, the ratio is much more balanced, about 
117 boys to 100 girls. When family size gets to three, the ratio (104.52) falls in the 
normal interval of sex ratio at birth. Our sample shows 235 families have four children. 
Among these families, there are 448 boys and 492 girls, which lead to a fairly low boy to 
girl ratio, 91.1. Associated with family size from five to seven, we observe a slightly 
increase in the sex ratio of children, but it never reaches a level as high as for the two 
smallest family sizes. In the families with eight or nine children, there are much fewer 
boys compared to girls, which draw the sex ratio to an abnormally low level, 71 and 67 
respectively (See Figure 3,2).  
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Figure 3.1 Observations on Number of Children (CGSS) 
 
Figure 3.2 The Relation between the Sex Ratio and the Number of Children 
 
Figure 3.3 shows the relationship between mother‟s education and the sex composition of 
the children, illustrated with observations on the families with only one child. Among 
mothers who have not finished the 6-year primary school education, more of them tend to 
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have a boy as their only child. The 5-year education is a “watershed” because among 
mothers with 5 or more years of education, more of them tend to have a girl as their only 
child.   
On the right tail we observe an incipient tendency that higher education is associated with 
higher frequencies of having a boy. For mothers with 11 or 13 years of education, the 
difference is very small. But according to our sample data, one point deserves to be 
mentioned here: mothers with 12-year education have clearly higher frequency of having 
a boy as the only child. There can be many interpretations for this. One of them is that 
higher education means better knowledge and accessibility to the sex manipulation 
resources, and therefore more of them end up with a boy as they desired for their only 
child.  It is true if they truly prefer son over girl. But there is no evidence for that women 
with higher education do have such preference.  And because observations with higher 
education constitute only 4% of only-children‟s parents, the frequencies of them having a 
boy or a girl may not be representative of the total level.  
Figure 3.3  Mother’s Education and the Sex Composition of Children  
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3.3 Sex composition of the Children 
The most interesting variable is the “Boys among Children” (BAC) in a family.  The sex 
ratio at birth (SRB) is computed as the ratio of male births to female births within a given 
region and a time interval. Theoretically we can have unlimited number of possible 
values for SRB. And we indeed observe large SRB disparity across regions and different 
socioeconomic groups. And this is what we focused on in the previous chapters. However, 
in the final analysis, it is not the provinces or counties that “create” the next generation; it 
is the parents or the whole family if it is an extended family.  In this sense, we can 
consider the BAC as the SRB that is embodied in individual families. So it is of great 
importance to study how the BAC is determined within a family if we want to study birth 
masculinity of China.   
The overall sex ratio of children in our CGSS sample is 114.76, with 4921 boys to 4288 
girls. This is much lower than SRB for recent years. The main reason is BAC covers 
children of many ages, hence it is weighted average of historical SRB values (disregarded 
child mortality). It actually is close to China‟s SRB around 1995 which was 
115(Bhattacharjya, Sudarshan, Tuljapurkar, Shachter, & Feldman, 2008), 13 years before 
the survey. Table 3.1 below shows how sex compositions of children across individual 
families contribute to the overall ratio between boys and girls. The observations are first 
divided into 9 groups by family size/the number of children in the household. Families 
with the same number of children are in the same group.  Then we count the frequency 
for each form of sex composition conditioned on the family size. After that we can sum 
up the number of boys and girls in that group. Finally we work out the “sex ratio of 
children for each family size”, which is simply the sum of boys divided by the sum of 
girls.   
Take family size = 2 as an example. In our sample there are 1491 families who have two 
children. 886 of them have a boy and a girl, 245 have two girls and 360 have two boys. 
So the total number of girls born in these families is 245 times 2 plus 886, which is 1376. 
The total number of boys is 360 times plus 886, which is 1606. And the overall sex ratio 
of children among families with two children, is 1606 divided by 1376, which is 116.72.  
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Table 3.1 The Link of  Sex Composition of Children and the Overall Sex Ratios 
  
 Boys Among|       Sum of      Sum of      Sex ratio of Children 
   Children |      Freq.       Boys        Girls       for each family size 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,048                 (1) 
          1 |      1,461        1461        1048   139.41 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
          0 |        245             
         .5 |        886           (2) 
          1 |        360        1606        1376  116.72 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
          0 |         43         
   .3333333 |        291        
   .6666667 |        241           (3)  
          1 |         74         995         952  104.52 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
          0 |         10         
        .25 |         74        
         .5 |         90        
        .75 |         50           (4) 
          1 |         11         448         492  91.06 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
          0 |          4         
         .2 |         19        
         .4 |         25        
         .6 |         25        
         .8 |         22           (5) 
          1 |          1         237         243  97.53 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
          0 |          1         
   .1666667 |          3         
   .3333333 |          6        
         .5 |         11        
   .6666667 |          7        
   .8333333 |          4           (6) 
          1 |          1         102          96  106.25 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
   .2857143 |          2        
   .4285714 |          2        
   .5714286 |          6           (7) 
   .7142857 |          2          44          40  110.00 
------------+------------------------------------------------------------- 
        .25 |          1        
       .375 |          1           (8) 
       .625 |          1          10          14  71.43 
------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
   .1111111 |          1        
   .2222222 |          1        
   .3333333 |          1           (9) 
   .6666667 |          2          18       27  66.67 
------------+--------------------------------------------------------------- 
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3.4 The Model 
Dependent variable 
We want to examine how characteristics of individuals and their households affect the 
sex composition of their children. “Boys among Children” (BAC) can indicate the sex 
composition of the children, and thus is the variable we want to explain.  
As we can see in Table 3.1, “Boys among Children” (BAC) is a discrete variable. Unlike 
the “sex ratio at birth” (SRB) we discussed in previous chapters, BAC cannot take 
unlimited number of values due to the biological or socioeconomic restriction on the 
number of children a couple can have in their entire life.  
If there is only one child, it is either a boy or a girl. If a couple has two children, there are 
only three possibilities for their children sex composition: both are girls, both are boys or 
a boy and a girl. For a family having as many as 9 children, the forms of sex composition 
are more various but still limited.  It is like the couple is facing with a group of options 
when they decide to have a certain number of children, and the actual BAC is the result 
of their decision and action. The question we are interested in here, is which factors lead 
the couple to end up with “this” form of sex ratio of children, instead of the other forms. 
The largest family size in our sample is 9. With family size from 1 to 9, there are 29 
options of sex composition of children:  
(0, .11, .13, .14, .17, .20, .22, .25, .29, .33, .38, .40, .43, .44, .50, .56, .57, .60, .63, .67, .71
, .75, .78, .80, .83, .86, .88, .89, 1.00) 
So there is a clear ordering of the outcome variable BAC. The size of difference is 
inconsistent, i.e. the spacing between successive categories is not even. For example, the 
difference between the first option 0 and the second option .11 is 0.11; while the 
difference between the second and the third option is 0.02.  Therefore, BAC is not a 
continuous variable, and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimators are biased. The Ordered 
Logistic Regression will be a good choice.  
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More specifically, the General Ordered Response model will be used. One of the 
assumptions underlying ordered logistic regression is that the relationship between each 
pair of outcome groups is the same.  In other words, ordered logistic regression assumes 
that the coefficients that describe the relationship between, say, the lowest versus all 
higher categories of the response variable are the same as those that describe the 
relationship between the next lowest category and all higher categories, etc.  This is 
called the proportional odds assumption or the parallel regression assumption. And our 
primary analysis shows that our model violated this assumption. Therefore, we have to 
use the general ordered response model (Boes, 2006). 
But we do not use BAC directly as our dependent variable. Instead we convert BAC into 
a real categorical variable. I generate a new variable called “dsp” with the label as 
“degree of son preference”, and categorize the original BAC values into five groups. 
dsp=1 means least son preference, dsp=5 means most son preference, while dsp=3 when 
BAC=0.5 which means balanced sex composition of children. Note that “degree of son 
preference” is not an attitudinal variable here. It is just the categorized boys‟ number 
among children. It can be considered as the manifestation of the underlying son 
preference. And it is not a specific “son preference” from father or mother, but a 
combined or integrated “son preference” from both father and mother.    
Explanatory variables 
Based on the findings from the previous chapter, we assume that wife‟s education 
(denoted as “wedu”) has a negative effect on the “degree of son preference”, while the 
husband‟s education (“hedu”) has the opposite effect. And we assume that current 
employment (“ce”) of the wife is also relevant because if the wife has a decent job and 
relatively independent from the husband, then the family will show more respect to 
female. In such family, preference for son may not be very strong. We assume that lower 
fertility (number of children, “noc”) is associated with relatively more male births. 
Therefore, families with fewer children, the children are more likely are boys than girls. 
And we assume, ethnic groups (“minority”) do not have son preference or their son 
preference is not as strong as Han people. Urban couples (“urban”) usually have better 
access to sex-selective technology, but they are also more exposed to new values like 
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gender equality thus have less preference for son than the rural couples. Therefore, we 
assume that urban families have lower son preference. Similarly, we consider the total 
family income (“tfinc”) and the ownership of the house (“ownh”) have negative effect on 
son preference because it means the parents have good resources to support themselves 
when they are older and do not rely on family support. This lowers the traditional value 
of sons as a parents‟ supporter. So parents who are wealthier have lower son preference. 
The last variable is the happiness of the wife (“hpns”). It is a self-evaluation variable 
from a question asked in the Questionnaire A of CGSS 2008. We assume that a happy 
wife has a lower preference for sons. She is happy about her life means she feels good 
about herself and thus is more likely to hold an equal gender norm.  
Table 3.2  Variable Descriptions with CGSS Data 
Variables  Descriptions 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
dsp   Degress of son preference(1= least preference, 5=most preference) 
hedu                          Education level of the husband (1=lowest, 6=highest) 
wedu   Education level of the wife (1=lowest, 6=highest) 
ce                Current employment of the wife (0=unemployed, 1=employed) 
noc               Number of children in the family  
minority          Ethnic group of the wife(0=Han, 1=Non-Han) 
urban             Registered residence/hukou of the wife (0= rural, 1= urban) 
tfinc             Total family income 
ownh              Ownership of house (0=no, 1=yes) 
hpns              Degree of happiness  of the wife (1=least happy, 2=ok, 3=very happy) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3.3  Summary of Variables with CGSS Data 
 
    Variable |       Obs        Mean    Std. Dev.       Min        Max 
-------------+-------------------------------------------------------- 
         dsp |      5033    3.208027    1.644304          1          5 
        hedu |      5497    3.312352    1.240883          1          6 
        wedu |      5487     2.97649    1.313297          1          6 
          ce |      6000    .6578333    .4744746          0          1 
         noc |      6000    1.534833     1.20514          0          9 
    minority |      6000       .0715    .2576797          0          1 
       urban |      6000        .569    .4952574          0          1 
       tfinc |      6000    607209.7     2327948          0    9999999 
        ownh |      6000       .8105    .3919379          0          1 
        hpns |      6000      2.0945    .5632844          1          3 
---------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Model specification:  
The dependent variable is “degree of son preference”, denoted as “dsp”. It has 5 
categories. 
     
{
 
 
 
 
                                 
                                           
                                           
                                                
                                               
 
  (      |  )   (     
  )             
Where    is a      vector including the 9 explanatory variables (see Table 3.2) and an 
element 1to carry the intercept.    is also a      vector with elements as the 9 
coefficients for the explanatory variables.   And the    are the threshold parameters, 
where                .  
We first run General Ordered Logit regression with the whole sample. Of course, 
observations without children are automatically excluded of course, left with 4720 
observations.  Then we analyze the model again with a subsample which contains the 
observations under the age of 49. We pay special interests in this group because they are 
still in the reproductive range or have just finished when the survey was conducted. The 
information on these children is the most recent information for us. This subgroup 
contains 2906 observations.  
 
3.5 The Results   
Table 3.4 Generalized Ordered Logit Regression with CGSS data (whole sample) 
Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates               Number of obs   =       4720 
                                                  LR chi2(36)     =    9317.93 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -2091.1093                       Pseudo R2       =     0.6902 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         dsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1            | 
        hedu |    .057857   .1275196     0.45   0.650    -.1920768    .3077907 
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        wedu |  -.1750185   .1264165    -1.38   0.166    -.4227903    .0727532 
          ce |   .2533283   .2482309     1.02   0.307    -.2331952    .7398519 
         noc |   5.443885   .2728422    19.95   0.000     4.909124    5.978645 
    minority |  -.1569149   .3840356    -0.41   0.683    -.9096107     .595781 
       urban |  -.0171322   .2580085    -0.07   0.947    -.5228196    .4885552 
       tfinc |  -1.27e-08   5.55e-08    -0.23   0.819    -1.21e-07    9.61e-08 
        ownh |   .1561165   .3578478     0.44   0.663    -.5452522    .8574853 
        hpns |  -.4022137   .1918707    -2.10   0.036    -.7782734   -.0261541 
       _cons |  -12.86494   1.342379    -9.58   0.000    -15.49595   -10.23392 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
        hedu |   .0191627   .0595426     0.32   0.748    -.0975387    .1358641 
        wedu |  -.1402631   .0677558    -2.07   0.038    -.2730621   -.0074642 
          ce |  -.1017204   .1192397    -0.85   0.394    -.3354259    .1319851 
         noc |  -.4579874   .0512968    -8.93   0.000    -.5585272   -.3574476 
    minority |   .1437919   .1788315     0.80   0.421    -.2067114    .4942952 
       urban |   .2190482   .1217299     1.80   0.072     -.019538    .4576344 
       tfinc |  -9.45e-09   2.74e-08    -0.34   0.731    -6.32e-08    4.43e-08 
        ownh |   .1251234   .1809641     0.69   0.489    -.2295596    .4798064 
        hpns |  -.0442992   .0860917    -0.51   0.607    -.2130358    .1244374 
       _cons |   2.281998   .5747816     3.97   0.000     1.155447    3.408549 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
        hedu |   .0180571   .0607562     0.30   0.766    -.1010228     .137137 
        wedu |  -.2788094   .0728935    -3.82   0.000     -.421678   -.1359408 
          ce |  -.0399112   .1209408    -0.33   0.741    -.2769508    .1971284 
         noc |   .2734288   .0507609     5.39   0.000     .1739393    .3729183 
    minority |   .0221726   .1789203     0.12   0.901    -.3285047    .3728498 
       urban |   .2578887   .1235283     2.09   0.037     .0157777    .4999997 
       tfinc |   5.37e-08   2.59e-08     2.07   0.038     2.93e-09    1.05e-07 
        ownh |   .1615075   .2021474     0.80   0.424     -.234694    .5577091 
        hpns |  -.0841765   .0876522    -0.96   0.337    -.2559716    .0876186 
       _cons |  -2.024779   .6035389    -3.35   0.001    -3.207693   -.8418644 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
4            | 
        hedu |   .1984378    .101822     1.95   0.051    -.0011296    .3980052 
        wedu |  -.1898765   .1099795    -1.73   0.084    -.4054324    .0256795 
          ce |   -.022393   .2351249    -0.10   0.924    -.4832293    .4384433 
         noc |  -5.962442   .2965991   -20.10   0.000    -6.543766   -5.381118 
    minority |   .3290429   .3181793     1.03   0.301     -.294577    .9526629 
       urban |   .1275851    .258314     0.49   0.621    -.3787011    .6338712 
       tfinc |   9.76e-08   3.78e-08     2.58   0.010     2.35e-08    1.72e-07 
        ownh |   .2453205   .3467936     0.71   0.479    -.4343824    .9250234 
        hpns |  -.4325719   .1806954    -2.39   0.017    -.7867284   -.0784155 
       _cons |   14.92473   1.332781    11.20   0.000     12.31253    17.53693 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
We find that higher level of wife‟s education is associated with a lower son preference, in 
both the second and third categories of degree of son preference. The formal 
interpretation is for one unit increase in wife‟s education, we expect a 0.14 decrease and a 
0.27 decrease in the log odds of preferring son over daughter, given all of the other 
variables in the model are held constant, in the second and the third category of “dsp”, 
respectively. But husband‟s education is not statistically significant for the determination 
of the degree of son preference.Besides, the number of children is also significant. We 
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find that it has positive effect on the odd orders of “dsp”. That is the number of children 
does not have a stable effect on the son preference. And the higher level of happiness of 
the wife seems to be associated with a lower son preference. The total family income is 
also a weak explanatory variable. It means the general well-being of the family is not 
relevant cannot indicate a degree of son preference in that family.  
Table 3.5 Generalized Ordered Logit Regression with CGSS data (sub-sample) 
Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates               Number of obs   =       2906 
                                                  LR chi2(36)     =    6287.81 
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000 
Log likelihood = -498.06571                       Pseudo R2       =     0.8632 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
         dsp |      Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
1            | 
        hedu |   .2985238   .3015704     0.99   0.322    -.2925433    .8895909 
        wedu |  -.3996359   .2495003    -1.60   0.109    -.8886474    .0893757 
          ce |   .6586929   .5026689     1.31   0.190    -.3265201    1.643906 
         noc |   6.520621   .5931522    10.99   0.000     5.358064    7.683178 
    minority |  -.2198773    .801844    -0.27   0.784    -1.791463    1.351708 
       urban |  -.5515582   .5196258    -1.06   0.288    -1.570006    .4668895 
       tfinc |  -1.33e-07   1.12e-07    -1.19   0.235    -3.52e-07    8.64e-08 
        ownh |  -.6273242   .6415572    -0.98   0.328    -1.884753    .6301049 
        hpns |  -.8340052   .3710404    -2.25   0.025    -1.561231   -.1067795 
       _cons |  -14.07764   2.550424    -5.52   0.000    -19.07638   -9.078897 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
2            | 
        hedu |  -.0977455   .1411588    -0.69   0.489    -.3744116    .1789206 
        wedu |  -.2588701   .1431572    -1.81   0.071    -.5394529    .0217128 
          ce |  -.3449672   .3140396    -1.10   0.272    -.9604735    .2705391 
         noc |  -2.118402   .1784994   -11.87   0.000    -2.468255    -1.76855 
    minority |  -.0295828   .3458228    -0.09   0.932     -.707383    .6482174 
       urban |   .3527962   .2935683     1.20   0.229     -.222587    .9281795 
       tfinc |  -1.61e-08   8.37e-08    -0.19   0.847    -1.80e-07    1.48e-07 
        ownh |  -.2644894   .3188834    -0.83   0.407    -.8894895    .3605106 
        hpns |  -.4008528   .1939829    -2.07   0.039    -.7810524   -.0206532 
       _cons |    9.33436   1.275386     7.32   0.000      6.83465    11.83407 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
3            | 
        hedu |   .3598422   .1703479     2.11   0.035     .0259663     .693718 
        wedu |  -.7925853   .1816763    -4.36   0.000    -1.148664   -.4365063 
          ce |  -.1160696    .345846    -0.34   0.737    -.7939153     .561776 
         noc |   .8266231    .176913     4.67   0.000       .47988    1.173366 
    minority |   .2397129   .3819207     0.63   0.530     -.508838    .9882638 
       urban |   .8816439   .3221615     2.74   0.006      .250219    1.513069 
       tfinc |   1.87e-07   6.54e-08     2.87   0.004     5.92e-08    3.15e-07 
        ownh |   .2913873    .354563     0.82   0.411    -.4035434     .986318 
        hpns |   .5270684   .2424601     2.17   0.030     .0518554    1.002281 
       _cons |  -6.665837   1.488033    -4.48   0.000    -9.582328   -3.749345 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
4            | 
        hedu |   .4617592   .3581249     1.29   0.197    -.2401528    1.163671 
        wedu |  -.7708926   .3518521    -2.19   0.028     -1.46051   -.0812751 
          ce |   .1647593   .9091367     0.18   0.856    -1.617116    1.946634 
         noc |  -9.799892   1.246622    -7.86   0.000    -12.24323   -7.356558 
    minority |   .1623617    .773323     0.21   0.834    -1.353324    1.678047 
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       urban |  -1.016763   1.184203    -0.86   0.391    -3.337758    1.304232 
       tfinc |  -1.54e-07   3.09e-07    -0.50   0.617    -7.59e-07    4.51e-07 
        ownh |   .0087282   .7165922     0.01   0.990    -1.395767    1.413223 
        hpns |   .1160024   .5166984     0.22   0.822     -.896708    1.128713 
       _cons |   26.29657   5.376498     4.89   0.000     15.75883    36.83431 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
We also observe a quite complex effect of the fertility level on the degree of son 
preference. But we observe a significant effect of wife‟s education on the decline of son 
preference. We find for one unit increase in wife‟s education, we expect a 0.79 decrease 
and a 0.77 decrease in the log odds of preferring son over daughter, given all of the other 
variables in the model are held constant, in the third and fourth categories of “dsp”. 
Wife‟s education shows a much stronger effect compared with that suggested by the 
whole sample. This means, within the younger group, wife‟s education is significant and 
strong factor for the decline in son preference.  On the other hand, we observe a positive 
relation between husband‟s education and the degree of son preference. Our data suggests 
that with one unit of increase in husband‟s education, the log odds of preferring son over 
daughter is expected to increase by about 0.36, while the other variables are held constant.  
 
3.6 Discussion 
Analyses with the individual level data confirm some of our finding from the macro level 
models. We find higher level of wife‟s education is associated with lower level of son 
preference. It seem like higher education among women makes individuals more open to 
modern gender norm and abandon son preference, which results in fewer sex-selections 
and thus reduce the overall SRB.  
But the fertility or the number of children is not a stable factor for the degree of son 
preference. The effects are significant but with opposite signs in different cases. It 
corresponds to the result from aggregate data analyses: low total fertility rate is not the 
main reason for inordinate SRB. 
And family‟s wealth is also a weak explanatory variable for the degree of son preference. 
And the general well-being of the parents is not relevant and cannot indicate a degree of 
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son preference in that family. These correspond to the finding with aggregate data: 
socioeconomic status does not explain much SRB disparities across regions.  
To sum up, with the individual data, we can still identify a strong effect of education on 
the degree of son preference, while other explanatory variables are not significant 
suggested by our data.  
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4 Conclusions 
In this thesis, we collected data on both provincial and county level from the 2010 census 
data in China.  We studied the geographic disparities in China of the Sex Ratio at Birth 
(SRB), defined as the number of baby boys per 100 baby girls born during a certain 
period. We also analyzed the determinants for the regional differentials of SRB, with a 
focus on the education‟s effects. Then we used survey data from CGSS 2008 to analyze 
how sex composition is determined by individuals and households characteristics.  The 
main conclusions can be summarized as following. 
(1) Education has significant effects on SRBs, suggested by both the macro level data 
and the individual data. Improvement on people‟s education can substantially 
reduce SRB, mainly through the reduction on son preference. Moreover, the 
female‟s relative education has significantly large effect on the decline in SRBs. 
In view of the main education variable we used in the aggregate analyses, “ays” 
comprises the whole population, including people beyond reproductive age span. 
Ideally I would have like to include “ays” for persons of prime reproductive ages 
only, but that data was not available from the 2010 census tabulations. 
(2) The socioeconomic status is not a very important factor for SRB. Using the latest 
census data we could not identify a clear effect of the socioeconomic status on 
SRB.  The inverted “U” relation suggested by Guilmoto and Ren (2011) has not 
been identified by our studies.  
(3) We find from the provincial data that SRB is increasing in fertility. But results 
from the county-level data show that it is no longer significant while other 
variables are introduced into the model. And with the CGSS data, we find the 
number of children is not a stable factor for the degree of son preference. 
Therefore, we conclude lower fertility is not the main reason for high SRB. 
(4) Due to lack of public resources of support for the elderly, the traditional elderly 
support form is still prevailed.  It reinforces people‟s preference for sons and 
tends to increase SRB. 
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Contrary to the earlier findings which suggest higher education gives better access to sex-
selective abortion and thus increases the excess male births, this thesis finds a clear effect 
of education on decreasing the level of SRB. At the individual level, increase in mothers‟ 
education is going to reduce the number of boys among the children. Higher education 
leads to a better well-being of women, winning respect for females in general. So the 
family will be more open to modern gender norm and abandon son preference, which 
results in fewer sex-selections and thus reduce the overall SRB. The effect of education 
on aggregate level suggests if there are quite a few people who are highly educated and 
start to adopt new gender norm. And such norm can be spread fast through a society, then 
the effects of education on SRB are actually amplified by passing the new gender norm to 
the less educated group.  
 
The main inspiration from this thesis is in current China, education has started to play a 
role of reducing people‟s preference for sons. The improvement in people‟s education 
level, especially the female education level, will accelerate the pace for sex ratio at birth 
to return to the normal range.  
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